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Introduction 
 
 
Saving Transatlantic Cooperation and the 
Iran Nuclear Deal 
A View from Europe and the United States 
Corentin Brustlein, James Dobbins, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Oliver Meier, Marco Overhaus, Neil Quilliam, 
Charles Ries, Dorothée Schmid, Sanam Vakil, and Azadeh Zamirirad 
Transatlantic differences over the future of the Iran nuclear deal – or the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of July 2015 – are damaging a nuclear accord that 
all parties, except the United States, see as delivering on its purpose. They also increase 
the risk of Washington and European capitals working at cross-purposes vis-à-vis Iran 
and broader regional policies. To avoid such a scenario, the E3 (France, Germany, United 
Kingdom)/European Union (EU) and the United States need to set up new channels of 
communication to avoid a transatlantic rift, to attempt – if at all possible – to preserve 
the Iran deal, and to secure its benefits for regional and global security. 
 
US and European approaches towards Iran 
have increasingly grown apart. Washington 
and Europe differ in their threat percep-
tions, their preferred foreign policy tools, 
and their general outlooks on Tehran. Euro-
pean actors generally do not see Iran as the 
main source of regional instability in the 
Middle East and have stressed the significance 
of engagement to complement coercive meas-
ures. Few of the above elements apply to 
the current US administration. The context 
could hardly be more challenging for trans-
atlantic cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal. 
Although President Donald Trump once 
again waived nuclear-related sanctions in 
January, he did not certify that the nuclear 
agreement is still in the national security 
interest of the United States, leaving the 
JCPOA in limbo. In his January 12th state-
ment, the President issued an ultimatum to 
Congress and his European partners, giving 
them a “last chance” to fix what he described 
as the deal’s “disastrous flaws” by mid-May 
2018. The administration seeks to eliminate 
the deal’s “sunset clauses” by making its 
restrictions permanently binding, to add 
restrictions on Iran’s missile programme, 
and to alter provisions so that “anytime, 
anywhere” inspections become possible. If 
these conditions are not met, the President 
stated that the United States would leave 
the agreement unilaterally. 
At the same time, European officials 
have made it clear that they will not use 
the JCPOA to leverage Iran on non-nuclear-
related issues, and there is a strong Euro-
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pean commitment to keep the nuclear 
agreement intact. Against this background, 
it might well be that transatlantic partners 
are unable to find a path towards keeping 
the United States in the JCPOA. Even if Wa-
shington leaves the agreement, however, 
transatlantic coordination will still be 
needed to prevent further deterioration in 
relations, which could make cooperation 
in dealing with Iran difficult and even in-
clude a trade war across the Atlantic. With 
or without US participation in the nuclear 
deal, transatlantic cooperation remains 
desirable and possible. After all, the United 
States and Europe share the objectives of 
preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-
weapon state, halting its development of 
long-range nuclear-capable missiles, encour-
aging adherence to human rights norms, 
and curbing its activities in the region. 
There are still options to preserve trans-
atlantic unity while also creating oppor-
tunities for wider cooperation on Iran. 
Option A: Keeping the United States 
in the Nuclear Agreement 
For this option to be feasible, both Washing-
ton and Europe must demonstrate a willing-
ness to compromise. The Trump adminis-
tration needs to accept less than its maxi-
malist demands and acknowledge that only 
by doing so will its European partners be 
open to addressing issues related to Iran’s 
regional policies and missile activities. At 
the same time, Europeans have to be more 
vocal about US concerns that they do share. 
They also need to continue to impress on 
their US interlocutors that a unilateral 
US withdrawal would have a detrimental 
impact upon transatlantic relations. More-
over, both sides should offer clear and 
specific proposals on how – and through 
what channels – they plan to resolve cur-
rent disputes over the Iran nuclear deal 
and the wider portfolio of issues. 
Even if the US administration continues 
to waive nuclear-related sanctions after 
mid-May, uncertainty about future imple-
mentation will prevail. The administration 
is currently required to certify every 90 days 
that the Iran accord remains in the interest 
of US national security and to renew sanc-
tions waivers every 120 days. Extending these 
timelines or eliminating them altogether – 
steps Congress is considering in its debates 
on changing the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA) of 2015 – would provide 
the necessary breathing space for a continu-
ous transatlantic dialogue on the future of 
the JCPOA. Here, Europeans are well-advised 
to continue engaging with US legislators 
to reduce the risk of Congress amending 
INARA in a way that would bring Washing-
ton into violation of the JCPOA. 
In order to address the issue of “sunsets”, 
both sides could begin discussions on how 
to turn some of the restrictions on Iran’s 
nuclear activities into more general norms 
and rules within the non-proliferation 
regime. Such an approach would have the 
advantage of seeking to extend some of 
the limits beyond the timelines contained 
in the JCPOA while also making them appli-
cable to other states. A “Dialogue on Non-
proliferation Benefits”, for instance, could 
strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) by embedding in it norms for prolif-
eration-resistant nuclear reactors or against 
reprocessing. Another way of extending re-
strictions by elevating them to multilateral 
norms might be to encourage states to open 
sensitive facilities, such as those for medical 
isotope production, to multilateral coopera-
tion. This would, in fact, strengthen the 
NPT as a whole instead of limiting it to the 
Iranian case. Given that the sunset clauses 
come into play many years in the future, 
there should be ample time to align US and 
European views, provided both sides com-
mit to work towards that objective without 
the imposition of artificial deadlines. 
Some proliferation concerns, however, 
are best discussed within the framework 
of the nuclear deal itself. As specified in the 
JCPOA, the so-called Joint Commission – 
consisting of Iran and the other parties to 
the agreement (E3/EU+3) – can “modify, as 
necessary, procedures to govern its activ-
ities”. Using this forum could be an open-
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ing to address some US concerns, such as 
the issue of Section T. That section is vague 
in specifying the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency’s ability to verify the absence 
of activities “which could contribute to the 
development of a nuclear explosive device”. 
Such an approach could serve as a precedent 
on how to make better use of the JCPOA it-
self to direct concerns about Iranian com-
pliance. In order to coordinate their efforts, 
transatlantic partners should institutional-
ise a forum of their own that would meet 
prior to sessions of the Joint Commission. 
Furthermore, a regional security channel 
should be convened. A “Transatlantic Dia-
logue on Gulf Security” could be a starting 
point to discuss issues of mutual concern, 
such as the conflict in Yemen, ballistic 
missile programmes, or nuclear safety. For 
such a dialogue to be meaningful, it would 
require high-level political participation. 
First, transatlantic partners need to define 
attainable milestones. This should be dis-
cussed in a non-public setting under less 
political pressure. Should an agreement 
on the substance of such a dialogue be 
achieved, multilateral talks with Iran and 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
could then be facilitated. Regular status 
reports from the US and European sides 
should be used to keep the process moving. 
The aim of these proposed steps is to pro-
duce a common understanding that can save 
the JCPOA, thereby strengthening some of 
its provisions without violating the agree-
ment, while allowing for new multilateral 
fora to address other areas of regional con-
cern. This would be the optimal outcome, 
but it will also be necessary to prepare for 
alternative options, including the prospect 
of the United States leaving the agreement. 
Option B: Managing a US Exit 
While Saving the Agreement 
If nuclear-related US sanctions are re-
imposed in mid-May, this in itself does not 
need to lead to the collapse of the nuclear 
deal. As long as the remaining parties to 
the agreement – first and foremost Iran – 
continue to adhere to the JCPOA and UN 
Security Council Resolution 2231, a US 
withdrawal might not kill the accord. Should 
the United States re-impose nuclear-related 
sanctions, the E3/EU’s first priority will be 
to prevent the enforcement of secondary 
sanctions. Political channels between Wa-
shington and the remaining E3/EU+2 will 
be needed to discuss the specifics of US 
withdrawal, allowing for the possibility 
of a “soft” US exit, whereby Washington 
would re-impose sanctions but refrain 
from enforcing them extraterritorially. If 
Washington opts for a soft exit, the remain-
ing parties can work together to keep the 
JCPOA alive and leave the door open for a 
US return. This will require significant as-
surances to private-sector investors in Iran 
that they will be protected from possible 
secondary sanctions enforcement, thereby 
reducing as much uncertainty as possible 
so that Iran continues to see the economic 
benefits of adhering to the agreement. 
Bringing Washington back into the 
existing agreement – now or under a new 
US administration – should remain an 
option. However, European governments 
will insist that Washington cannot get a 
better deal by leaving it. Moreover, leaving 
the JCPOA makes additional non-prolifer-
ation and regional security measures less 
likely. Maintaining bridges for Washing-
ton’s eventual return to the JCPOA after 
an exit would require close coordination 
by the E3/EU with Russia, China, and most 
importantly, with Iran to secure their con-
tinued commitment to the nuclear deal. 
If the Trump administration leaves the 
agreement and also acts to impede the E3/ 
EU+2 from economic cooperation with Iran, 
tough European counter-measures are likely 
to follow. Given the broad international 
support for the JCPOA – including from 
a number of key US allies such as Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia, and Canada – 
the United States may well be isolated. The 
political costs of Washington leaving the 
deal would thus be high, including long-
lasting damage to US reliability in the eyes 
of international partners. 
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A European response could include reviv-
ing its Blocking Statute of 1996 to counter 
US extraterritorial sanctions imposed on 
European companies. This could be a neces-
sary step to protect the legitimate interests 
of European enterprises. Updating the an-
nex of that statute would already send a 
message to Washington that Europeans 
mean business. They could also draft new 
legislation that would allow for counter-
measures against US companies and require 
US subsidiaries located in Europe to adhere 
to European regulations where these differ 
from American regulations. 
European partners have called for 
continued US participation in the JCPOA 
beyond May 2018. As long as the United 
States keeps implementing the agreement, 
there is a much better chance of finding 
common ground on the JCPOA and issues 
outside the agreement’s scope. Should the 
United States leave the deal, transatlantic 
conditions for coming to terms on nuclear- 
and non-nuclear-related issues will worsen 
significantly. Moreover, the United States 
and its European partners will run the risk 
of further transatlantic alienation and a 
trade war, making an effective alignment 
of their Iran policies much less likely. Most 
importantly, however, uncertainty about 
the future of the JCPOA may push Iran itself 
out of the deal, possibly bringing Tehran 
closer to the nuclear threshold while leav-
ing the international community divided 
and unable to respond effectively. Trans-
atlantic partners should have a strong inter-
est in avoiding such a worst-case scenario. 
Time for Transatlantic Cooperation 
Strong transatlantic cooperation holds the 
best prospects for achieving the core com-
mon objective of preventing a nuclear-
armed Iran. Americans and Europeans need 
to step up their consultation efforts, and 
they need to do this now. They should con-
tinue to consult by building up issue-specific 
fora outside of the JCPOA, agreeing on tan-
gible goals. Both sides also need to find a 
common understanding on how to sequence  
problems and issues of mutual interest 
to find short- and long-term solutions. By 
addressing issues step by step rather than 
in an all-or-nothing manner, they can pave 
the way for a continuous transatlantic dia-
logue on the JCPOA and on broader regional 
issues. These fora can also serve as a clear-
ing house for issues to be taken to the Joint 
Commission, which oversees implementa-
tion of the Iran deal. Such cooperation will 
be important even if it cannot induce the 
United States to remain in the JCPOA. A 
negotiated US exit from the agreement can 
increase the prospects of the deal’s survival 
and address other important issues impact-
ing regional stability. Most significantly, 
ongoing dialogue and coordination among 
transatlantic partners would send a strong 
political message, namely that the United 
States and its European partners still form 
a powerful alliance of strong, like-minded 
actors on the global stage. 
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